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I.
STATEMENT OF SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTION
The original issue presented on appeal was whether Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4
(recently recodified as 78B-3-404) is subject to tolling under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35
(recently recodified as 78B-2-104).1 In this Court's February 2, 2009, Order, the Court
requested that the parties submit supplemental briefs on the following question:
In what way, if any, does the language of 78-12-35 limit its
application to the provisions of 78-14-4?
Therefore, Defendant Dr. Grigsby provides the following supplemental brief to assist this
Court in evaluating the proper interpretation and application of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-35.
II.
ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, which codifies the tolling effect of a defendant's
absence from the state on an applicable statute of limitation, was amended in 1987. The
Utah Legislature substituted more specific language, highlighted below, to indicate that
the tolling effect of an absence from the state is limited to statutory terms of limitation
contained within Chapter 12 of Title 78:

Appellant notes that the Legislature has recodified Title 78, a change that went
into effect on February 7, 2008. Because the renumbering does not change the analysis
below, and because any substantive changes do not apply to this analysis, Appellant will
cite to the version of Title 78 that was cited by the parties in their briefs and in this
Court's February 2, 2009, Order. See Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, n. 2.
-1-

Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is
out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term
as limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If
after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the
time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 clearly
limits the tolling effect of an absence from the state to statutory terms of limitation
contained within Chapter 12 of Title 78. The two-year statute of limitations for medical
malpractice actions, which is codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4, is not a statute of
limitations contained within "this chapter," Chapter 12 of Title 78. Therefore, pursuant to
the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, an action against a health care provider
is not tolled during the care provider's absence from the state of Utah.
Based on the applicable legal standard as applied to undisputed facts, the district
court did not err when it determined as a matter of law that the "Plaintiffs' claim against
Dr. Grigsby is time-barred on its face." R. 859. "[W]e may affirm a grant of summary
judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below."
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993) (citing Hill v. Seattle First Nat 7
Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992)).
A.
The Plain Language of Section 78-12-35 Restricts the Tolling Effect of an Absence
From the State to Statutory Terms of Limitation Contained Within
Chapter 12 of Title 78.
The Utah Supreme Court has pointed out that "Utah has developed an extensive

-2-

statutory scheme addressing the limitations of actions

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-

12-1 to 78-12-48 (2002)." Beaver County v. Property TaxDiv. of the Utah State Tax
Comm % 2006 UT 6, \ 37,128 P.3d 1187. In other words, these statutes, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-2-1 to 78-12-48, constitute "an extensive statutory scheme addressing the
limitations of actions." However, the extensive statutory scheme addressing the
limitations of actions found in chapter 12 of Title 78 is not exhaustive. The Legislature
has also established statute of limitations for certain specific civil actions, including the
two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice causes of action found in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-4. As this Court recently indicated:
It is the Legislature's prerogative to set statutes of limitation.
It is also the Legislature's prerogative to set the terms by
which a statute will be tolled.
Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ^ 21, 158 P.3d 532. Within the "extensive statutory
scheme addressing the limitations of actions" of Chapter 12 of Title 78, the Utah
Legislature has included several statutory methods for tolling statutes of limitation. See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-35 to 78-12-41. In particular, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35
provides for the tolling effect of a person's absence from the state:
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is
out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term
as limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If
after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the
time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action.
(Emphasis added.) The plain language of Section 78-12-35 confines the tolling effect of
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an absence from the state to statutory terms "as limited by this chapter." In other words,
the tolling of a statute of limitations as a result of a defendant's absence from the state is
"limited" to the statutory scheme addressing the limitations of actions found in chapter 12
of Title 78, i.e., Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-1 to 78-12-48.
The Utah Supreme Court has pointed out that the "first step in any statutory
interpretation is to examine the plain meaning of the statute." Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39,
K 10, 191 P.3d 4. To ascertain the plain meaning of a statute, the court interprets each
term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning:
When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look
first to the plain language of the statute. In so doing, [w]e
presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and
give effect to each term according to its ordinary and
accepted meaning.
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 2001 UT 29, ^f 12, 24 P.3d 928 (quotation
marks and citations omitted, alterations in original) (emphasis added).
Ballentine's Law Dictionary (1969) defines the term "limited" as follows:
"Narrow, restricted, circumscribed, inclosed within a certain limit; hemmed in; confined;
bounded." The court in Cheyney v. Smith, 3 Ariz. 143, 155 (Ariz. 1890), defined the term
"limited" similarly:
The word 'limited' means narrow, restricted. It is
synonymous with the word 'circumscribe'; and that word
means to inclose within a certain limit; to hem in; to confine;
to bound; to limit; to restrict, etc.
According to the plain meaning of "limited," Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 provides that

-4-

the tolling effect of a defendant's absence from the state is confined or restricted to the
statutory terms or statute of limitations contained within "this chapter," chapter 12 of
Title 78: "Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state,
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his
return to the state." (Emphasis added.)
Although the second sentence in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 does not contain the
same express limitation, it is clearly implied that the tolling effect of a defendant's
absence from the state is confined or restricted to statutory terms or statute of limitations
contained within "this chapter," chapter 12, regardless of whether the person was out of
the state when the cause of action accrued or the person was out of the state after the
cause of action accrued. As the Utah Supreme Court pointed out:
It is to be observed, moreover, that statutory enactments are to
be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and
meaningful, and that interpretations are to be avoided which
render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd.
Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). It would be nonsensical
and illogical to interpret Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 to limit the tolling effect of a
defendant who is absent from the state if the defendant happens to be outside of the state
when the cause of action accrues, but if the defendant leaves the state the day after the
cause of action accrues, the same limitation would not apply.
Plaintiffs may argue that if the tolling effect of absence from the state pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 is restricted to Chapter 12 of Title 78, then Utah Code Ann.
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§ 78-12-1 expands the scope of Chapter 12 to include "specific cases where a different
limitation is prescribed by statute," such as Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4. However, such an
expansion would be contrary to the general rules of statutory construction. The Utah
Supreme Court has pointed out:
When we are faced with two statutes that purport to cover the
same subject, we seek to determine the legislature's intent as
to which applies. In doing this, we follow the general rules of
statutory construction, which provide both that 'the best
evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the
statute,' and that 'a more specific statute governs instead of a
more general statute.'
Jensen v. IHCHosps., 944 P.2d 327, 331 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). The plain
language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 clearly indicates that "the action may be
commenced within the term as limited by this chapter." In other words, the tolling effect
of absence from the state is restricted to statutory terms of limitation contained within
"this chapter," Chapter 12 of Title 78. Similarly, the more specific statute dealing with
restrictions on the tolling effect of absence from the state, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35,
governs instead of the more general statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1, that does not
specifically address the tolling effect of absence from the state. In addition, these two
statutes, 78-12-35 and 78-12-1, can be read to be consistent with one another regarding
the fact that 78-12-35 is to be limited to application to only statutes of limitation in
Chapter 12 of Title 78. During oral argument before this Court on February 2, 2009,
Justice Michael J. Wilkins indicated that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 "would appear by
its own language to be limited to application to only statutes of limitation in Chapter 12,"
-6-

while pointing out that the medical malpractice statute of limitations is not in Chapter 12
of Title 78, concluding:
Because if you look earlier in Chapter 12, time for
commencement of actions generally, in what's now 78B-2102 [formerly 78-12-1], it says, 'Civil actions may be
commenced only within the periods prescribed in this chapter,
after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases
where a different limitation is prescribed by statute.' Now
one could read with consistency the proposition that the . ..
what used to be Chapter 12 applies to Chapter 12 and that
would lend some credence to the proposition that the medical
malpractice limitation was intended to be a creature of an
entirely different nature.
(Utah Supreme Court On-Demand Oral Arguments,
http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/sup/streams/index.cgi?mon=:::20092, February 2, 2009 —
Arnold v. Grigsby 20080255, Justice Michael J. Wilkins speaking). The plain language
of Section 78-12-35 indicates that the tolling effect of absence from the state is limited in
application to only statutes of limitation in Chapter 12 of Title 78, and the "medical
malpractice limitations was intended to be a creature of an entirely different nature."
B.
The Legislative History of Section 78-12-35 Indicates that the Utah Legislature
Added More Specific Language to Clarify that the Tolling Effect of an Absence
From the State Would Be Limited to Statutory Terms of Limitation Contained
Within Chapter 12 of Title 78.
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated, "The evolution of a statute through
amendment by the Legislature may also shed light on a statute's intended meaning."
Olseth, 2007 UT 29 at \ 23. The Court went on to point out that the Utah Legislature has
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not significantly amended Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 since it was originally enacted:
"Utah Code section 78-12-35 does not differ materially from its original version enacted
in 1872." Id. at % 16. However, in 1987, the Utah Legislature made a significant change
to the statute. The previous version of section 78-12-35 did not expressly restrict the
tolling effect of absence from the state to statutory terms of limitation contained within
Chapter 12 of Title 78:
If when a cause of action accrues against a person when he is
out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term
herein limited after his return to the state; and if after a cause
of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his
absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement
of the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (1953) (emphasis added). In 1987, the Utah Legislature
substituted "as limited by this chapter" for the phrase "herein limited" in Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-35. Therefore, the Utah Legislature added more specific language to
section 78-12-35 to clearly indicate that the tolling effect of an absence from the state
would be limited to statutory terms of limitation contained within Chapter 12 of Title 78.
A review of the Utah Code indicates that such a restriction would have impacted
ten (10) statutes of limitation that were contained outside of Chapter 12 of Title 78 prior
to 1987.2 The defendants in these non-Chapter 12 statutes of limitations included bars

2

Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-19-8 (enacted in 1981); 32A-14a-102 (enacted in 1985);
63G-3-603 (enacted in 1985); 63G-3-817 (enacted in 1980); 70A-2-725 (enacted in
1965); 70C-7-205 (enacted in 1985); 75-3-108 (enacted in 1975); 75-3-802 (enacted in
1975); 76-10-925 (enacted in 1979); and 78B-3-404 (enacted in 1976).
-8-

and stores that sold a.coho, (32A-14a-102), state agencies (63G-3-603 and 63G-3-817),
retailers (70A-2-725), credit card companies (70C-7-205), an estate (75-3-802), and meta,
deaiers (76-10-925). None of these statutes oflimitations would seem to have been
direct* impacted by limiting thetollingeffect of absence from the state as defendants
that

are no, natural persons are generally static. Utah Code Ann. , 75-3-108 deals with

statute

of limitations on a decedent's cause(s) of actions, but Utah Code Ann. S 78B-2-

105 already tolls the statute of limitations in the case of death.
Arg uably,

the only individual defendants directly impacted by limiting the tolling

effects of absence from the state to Chapter .2 of Title 78 wouid have been health care
pro vider

defendants under Utah Code Ann. § § 26-19-8 and 78-14-4 (the statute at issue in

to appeal). However, the Utah Supreme Court pointed ou, that the Utah Legislature
purposefully chose to treat health care providers differently than other defendants: "The
avowed legislativepurpose for treating the Cass of health providers differently from other
defendants is stated in the Act itself." Alien v. InKrmounlaln Heakh Care, 635 P.2d 30,
3 1 .32

to

(Utah ,981). The Utah Supreme Court has also indicated that "we ha-ve] no need

speculate as to what purposes the Malpractice Act was intended to serve because the

<,, forth in 5 78-14-2." Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993).
purposes were set forth in 9 '° •*
The Utah Supreme Court has noted:
According to its own provisions, the purpose of the UHCMA
C o 'Provide a reasonable time in which actions may be
o l e n c e d against health care providers while mUmg that
nrrTo a specific period for which professional liability
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insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately
calculated.' Id §78-14-2.
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, H 30, 70 P.3d 904 (emphasis
added). Similarly, in Dowling v. Bullen, the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that the
purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to ease health care costs by
establishing a specific window of time to bring malpractice actions:
However, the stated purpose of the UHCMA is to alleviate health
care costs via the establishment of a fixed window of time "in which
actions may be commenced against health care providers[,] while
limiting that time to a specific period for which professional liability
insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated."
Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, \ 11, 94 P.3d 915. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2,
"Legislative findings and declarations - Purpose of act," provides:
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims
for damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising
from health care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of
these increases the insurance industry has substantially increased the
cost of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased
insurance premiums and increased claims is increased health care
cost, both through the health care providers passing the cost of
premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing
defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential
adversary in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are
discouraged from continuing to provide services because of the high
cost and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance.
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating
the adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's
health care system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by
enacting measures designed to encourage private insurance
companies to continue to provide health-related malpractice
insurance while at the same time establishing a mechanism to ensure
the availability of insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable
-10-

from private companies.
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide
a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against
health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period
for which professional liability insurance premiums can be
reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other
procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of
claims.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (emphasis added). The clear intent of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act was to treat health care provider defendants differently than other
defendants.
Therefore, the Utah Legislature's decision to exclude health care provider
defendants from the tolling effect of an absence from the state by limiting the application
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 to statutes of limitations contained within Chapter 12 of
Title 78 is clearly in keeping with the Utah Legislature's expressed intent in enacting the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act to limit the statutory term for bringing a malpractice
action to a specific period of time. The tolling effect of a health care defendant's absence
from the state would create a potentially limitless time for bringing a medical malpractice
action and thwart the expressly stated purpose and intent of the Legislature in enacting a
statute of limitations specifically for health care providers.
It is also important to remember that any health care provider defendant who
leaves the state is still subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court pursuant to Utah's
long arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24:
Utah's long-arm statute was enacted in 1969. It allows Utah's
-11-

courts to exert personal jurisdiction over any person, whether
or not a resident of Utah, if that person committed any of the
acts enumerated in the statute. The long-arm provisions apply
'so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the
fullest extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
The provisions allow service of process pursuant to rule 4 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on any party outside the
state.
Olseth, 2007 UT 29 at % 19. Consequently, this Court has pointed out that Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-35 is of limited utility:
Basically, the tolling statute was designed to address a
problem that no longer exists and the statute is, in that sense,
an anachronism. Despite the fact that the tolling statute is
anachronistic, however, it is clear, and it provides that a
statute is tolled during that period where a defendant is absent
from the state.
Id. at TJ 13. The "anachronistic" nature of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 further argues for
reasonably interpreting the plain language of this statute to limit its scope to exclude
health care provider defendants whose statutory term of limitation is not contained within
Chapter 12 of Title 78.
It is also important to note that the other tolling statutes contained in Chapter 12 of
Title 78 do not contain any express or implied limitation to statutory terms of limitation
contained within the chapter. These tolling statutes include the effect of death, war, and
disability-minority or legal incompetence-on statutory terms of limitation. In fact, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-36 was amended in the same senate bill that amended Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-35 in 1987. Although the Legislature included the new language, "as

-12-

limited by this chapter," in the amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, no such
limitation was included in the amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36, which
provides:
A person may not bring an action while under the age of
majority or mentally incompetent without a legal guardian.
During the time the person is underage or incompetent, the
statute of limitations for a cause of action other than for the
recovery of real property may not run.
In other words, the exclusion of this phrase from other tolling statutes reinforces the
interpretation that the Utah Legislature pointedly determined to restrict the tolling effects
of absence from the state to statutory terms of limitation "limited by this chapter,"
Chapter 12 of Title 78.
C
Since Section 78-12-35 Was Amended in 1987, Utah Courts Have Only Applied the
Tolling Effect of Absence from the State to Statutory Terms of Limitation Contained
Within Chapter 12 of Title 78.
The case law dealing directly with the applicability of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35
since the statute was amended in 1987 is in harmony with an interpretation that restricts
the tolling effects of absence from the state to statutory terms of limitation contained
within Chapter 12 of Title 78. There have been four cases that have directly addressed
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 since the statute was amended in 1987. In Olseth v. Larson,
the plaintiff filed a claim for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights violation. Olseth, 2007 UT
29 at ^ 6. The Reconstruction Civil Rights Act did not contain a statute of limitations for
a section 1983 action. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that "section 1983
-13-

claims were best characterized as tort actions for the recovery of damages for personal
injuries and federal courts must borrow the statute of limitations governing personal
injury actions in the state in which the section 1983 action was brought." Banks v. City of
Whitehall, 344 F.3d 550, 553 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 27576 (1985)). In Utah, the "statute of limitations for filing a personal injury action is four
years. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25." Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 805 (Utah
1998). Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations in Olseth was Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-25, which is clearly a statute of limitations within "this chapter," Chapter 12 of
Title 78. The Utah Supreme Court concluded: "We hold that section 78-12-35 does toll
the applicable statute of limitations when a person against whom a claim has accrued has
left the state of Utah." Id. at ^J 40 (emphasis in original).
In Lundv. Hall, 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997), the plaintiff claimed physical injuries
as a result of an automobile collision:
On January 12, 1989, plaintiff Rallet C. Lund and defendant
Eldon W. Hall were allegedly involved in an automobile
collision, whereby Hall hit a vehicle from behind, which in
turn hit Lund's vehicle from behind causing her physical
injuries.
Id. at 285. The same statute of limitations provision applied where the court said that the
"statute of limitations for filing a personal injury action is four years. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-25." Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 805 (Utah 1998). Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-25 is clearly a statute of limitations within Chapter 12 of Title 78. In Lund, the
Utah Supreme Court concluded: "Even if Hall had departed from the state, he was still
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subject to service of process pursuant to the nonresident motor vehicle act. Thus, under
our decision in Snyder, section 78-12-35 would not operate to toll the statute of
limitations on this action." Id. at 290.
In York v. Gardiner, 2006 UT App 471, the Utah Court of Appeals indicated that
the "district court held that York's claims were barred by Utah Code section 78-12-25(3),
the applicable statute of limitations." Id. at ^ 1. As noted above, Utah Code Ann. § 7812-25 is a statute of limitations within Chapter 12 of Title 78. The Utah Court of Appeals
concluded: "The district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that section
78-12-35 did not apply because Gardiner was at all times amenable to service of process
pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute." Id. at ^J 5.
Finally, in Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the Utah
Court of Appeals pointed out that "Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
claiming that the suit was barred by the eight year's statute of limitations set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (1984)." Id. at 112. The issue was whether "the statute of
limitations was tolled when defendant was out of the state for both personal and business
reasons even though he was amenable to service of process under Utah R. Civ. P. 4." Id.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-35. Id. at 113. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 is similarly a statute of
limitations within "this chapter," Chapter 12 of Title 78.
Each of the cases that have dealt directly with the applicability of Utah Code Ann.
§78-12-35 since the statute was amended in 1987 is in harmony with a statutory
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interpretation that restricts the tolling effects of absence from the state to statutes of
limitation contained within Chapter 12 of Title 78.
D.
Limiting the Application of the Tolling Effect for Absence From the State in Section
78-12-35 to Statutes of Limitation Contained Within Chapter 12 of Title 78
Minimizes the Potential Constitutional Conflict with the Commerce Clause.
Although the issue of whether the tolling statute, Section 78-12-35,
unconstitutionally violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution is not
directly before this Court, the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988), and its progeny, underscore
the potential constitutional infirmities of the issue of whether the language of Section 7812-35 limits its application to the provisions of Section 78-14-4. The Utah Supreme
Court has stated, "we have ca duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to
effectuate legislative intent and avoid and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or
infirmities.'" State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). This Court should construe
the statutory phrase, "the action may be commended within the term as limited by this
chapter," to exclude statutory terms outside of Chapter 12 of Title 78 generally, and the
statutory term of limitations contained within Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 specifically, so
as to avoid a conflict with the Commerce Clause in matters involving the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act and limit potential conflicts with the Commerce Clause generally.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, as well as the reasons set forth in the Appellant's
other briefs, the Defendant/Appellant Dr. Grigsby respectfully requests that the Utah
Supreme Court reverse the judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals and determine that
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 is not subject to tolling under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 and
uphold the summary judgment of the trial court.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of March, 2009.

BURBIDGE & WHITE, LLC

Daniel R. Harper
Attorneys for David Grigsby, M.D.
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